Nexus: Chapman's Journal of Law and Public Policy

A week ago, on February 24, 2010, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a crime suspect who invokes his right to remain silent, can be questioned again after 14 days.

The Fifth Amendment, which applies to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

In the Supreme Court’s well-known Miranda v. Arizona decision, the Court adopted measures to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right from the “inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation.” Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436 (1966). To counteract compelling interrogation pressures, the Miranda Court announced that police officers must warn a suspect prior to questioning that he has a right to remain silent, and a right to the presence of an attorney. If the suspect wishes to remain silent after the warnings, the interrogation must stop until an attorney is present. Alternatively, a suspect can waive his rights. However, the State must show that the waiver was, “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”

Then, in 1981, in Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court ruled that additional safeguards were necessary to protect a suspect's right to have counsel present at a subsequent interrogation, if he had previously requested counsel. Edwards v. Ariz., 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Thus, the Supreme Court held that a suspect cannot be subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him. Of course, if the suspect himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police, then his right is waived. However, when a suspect has invoked his Miranda rights during a custodial interrogation, the police cannot establish a valid waiver of his rights by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation. “Edwards’ Rule” as it is commonly known, ensures that police will not take advantage of a suspect by repeatedly “badgering” him into submission.

However, this past Wednesday, in a 9-0 decision, in Maryland v. Shatzer, the Supreme Court limited the rule it established in Edwards v. Arizona. Maryland v. Shatzer, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 1899 (Feb. 24, 2010). In 2003, police attempted to question an inmate incarcerated for a prior conviction, about allegations that he had sexually abused his son. The inmate invoked his Miranda rights and the interview was terminated. Later, the inmate was released back to the general population. Then, in 2006, police attempted to interview the inmate, who was still incarcerated, again. This time, the inmate waived his Miranda rights and made incriminatory statements. Subsequently, the inmate tried to suppress his statements pursuant to Edwards v. Arizona.

The Supreme Court ruled that extending Edwards to this case was not justified. The Court held that a 14 day break-in-custody was an ample amount of time for a suspect to get “reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.” In the present case, the Court held that the inmate’s return the general prison population after the 2003 interrogation resulted in a “break in custody.” Therefore, the two-and-a-half-year break was long enough to eliminate any of the inherently compelling pressures. Thus, Edwards was not applicable.

Consequently, Miranda rights are no longer “eternal.” Now, after a 14-day “break in custody,” the police are allowed to initiate a second conversation with a suspect.

Sources: Maryland v. Shatzer, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 1899 (Feb. 24, 2010), Edwards v. Ariz., 451 U.S. 477 (1981), Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436 (1966)